/* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== */ #include <openssl_grpc/base.h> #include <assert.h> #include <string.h> #include <openssl_grpc/mem.h> #include <openssl_grpc/cpu.h> #include "internal.h" #include "../../internal.h" // kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits is a mask that can be used to zero the lower four // bits of a |size_t|. static const size_t kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits = (size_t) -16; #define GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi) gcm_gmult_nohw((ctx)->Xi.u, (ctx)->gcm_key.Htable) #define GHASH(ctx, in, len) \ gcm_ghash_nohw((ctx)->Xi.u, (ctx)->gcm_key.Htable, in, len) // GHASH_CHUNK is "stride parameter" missioned to mitigate cache // trashing effect. In other words idea is to hash data while it's // still in L1 cache after encryption pass... #define GHASH_CHUNK (3 * 1024) #if defined(GHASH_ASM_X86_64) || defined(GHASH_ASM_X86) static inline void gcm_reduce_1bit(u128 *V) { if (sizeof(crypto_word_t) == 8) { uint64_t T = UINT64_C(0xe100000000000000) & (0 - (V->hi & 1)); V->hi = (V->lo << 63) | (V->hi >> 1); V->lo = (V->lo >> 1) ^ T; } else { uint32_t T = 0xe1000000U & (0 - (uint32_t)(V->hi & 1)); V->hi = (V->lo << 63) | (V->hi >> 1); V->lo = (V->lo >> 1) ^ ((uint64_t)T << 32); } } void gcm_init_ssse3(u128 Htable[16], const uint64_t H[2]) { Htable[0].hi = 0; Htable[0].lo = 0; u128 V; V.hi = H[1]; V.lo = H[0]; Htable[8] = V; gcm_reduce_1bit(&V); Htable[4] = V; gcm_reduce_1bit(&V); Htable[2] = V; gcm_reduce_1bit(&V); Htable[1] = V; Htable[3].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[2].hi, Htable[3].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[2].lo; V = Htable[4]; Htable[5].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[1].hi, Htable[5].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[1].lo; Htable[6].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[2].hi, Htable[6].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[2].lo; Htable[7].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[3].hi, Htable[7].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[3].lo; V = Htable[8]; Htable[9].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[1].hi, Htable[9].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[1].lo; Htable[10].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[2].hi, Htable[10].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[2].lo; Htable[11].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[3].hi, Htable[11].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[3].lo; Htable[12].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[4].hi, Htable[12].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[4].lo; Htable[13].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[5].hi, Htable[13].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[5].lo; Htable[14].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[6].hi, Htable[14].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[6].lo; Htable[15].hi = V.hi ^ Htable[7].hi, Htable[15].lo = V.lo ^ Htable[7].lo; // Treat |Htable| as a 16x16 byte table and transpose it. Thus, Htable[i] // contains the i'th byte of j*H for all j. uint8_t *Hbytes = (uint8_t *)Htable; for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++) { for (int j = 0; j < i; j++) { uint8_t tmp = Hbytes[16*i + j]; Hbytes[16*i + j] = Hbytes[16*j + i]; Hbytes[16*j + i] = tmp; } } } #endif // GHASH_ASM_X86_64 || GHASH_ASM_X86 #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF #undef GCM_MUL #define GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi) (*gcm_gmult_p)((ctx)->Xi.u, (ctx)->gcm_key.Htable) #undef GHASH #define GHASH(ctx, in, len) \ (*gcm_ghash_p)((ctx)->Xi.u, (ctx)->gcm_key.Htable, in, len) #endif // GCM_FUNCREF void CRYPTO_ghash_init(gmult_func *out_mult, ghash_func *out_hash, u128 *out_key, u128 out_table[16], int *out_is_avx, const uint8_t gcm_key[16]) { *out_is_avx = 0; union { uint64_t u[2]; uint8_t c[16]; } H; OPENSSL_memcpy(H.c, gcm_key, 16); // H is stored in host byte order H.u[0] = CRYPTO_bswap8(H.u[0]); H.u[1] = CRYPTO_bswap8(H.u[1]); OPENSSL_memcpy(out_key, H.c, 16); #if defined(GHASH_ASM_X86_64) if (crypto_gcm_clmul_enabled()) { if (((OPENSSL_ia32cap_get()[1] >> 22) & 0x41) == 0x41) { // AVX+MOVBE gcm_init_avx(out_table, H.u); *out_mult = gcm_gmult_avx; *out_hash = gcm_ghash_avx; *out_is_avx = 1; return; } gcm_init_clmul(out_table, H.u); *out_mult = gcm_gmult_clmul; *out_hash = gcm_ghash_clmul; return; } if (gcm_ssse3_capable()) { gcm_init_ssse3(out_table, H.u); *out_mult = gcm_gmult_ssse3; *out_hash = gcm_ghash_ssse3; return; } #elif defined(GHASH_ASM_X86) if (crypto_gcm_clmul_enabled()) { gcm_init_clmul(out_table, H.u); *out_mult = gcm_gmult_clmul; *out_hash = gcm_ghash_clmul; return; } if (gcm_ssse3_capable()) { gcm_init_ssse3(out_table, H.u); *out_mult = gcm_gmult_ssse3; *out_hash = gcm_ghash_ssse3; return; } #elif defined(GHASH_ASM_ARM) if (gcm_pmull_capable()) { gcm_init_v8(out_table, H.u); *out_mult = gcm_gmult_v8; *out_hash = gcm_ghash_v8; return; } if (gcm_neon_capable()) { gcm_init_neon(out_table, H.u); *out_mult = gcm_gmult_neon; *out_hash = gcm_ghash_neon; return; } #elif defined(GHASH_ASM_PPC64LE) if (CRYPTO_is_PPC64LE_vcrypto_capable()) { gcm_init_p8(out_table, H.u); *out_mult = gcm_gmult_p8; *out_hash = gcm_ghash_p8; return; } #endif gcm_init_nohw(out_table, H.u); *out_mult = gcm_gmult_nohw; *out_hash = gcm_ghash_nohw; } void CRYPTO_gcm128_init_key(GCM128_KEY *gcm_key, const AES_KEY *aes_key, block128_f block, int block_is_hwaes) { OPENSSL_memset(gcm_key, 0, sizeof(*gcm_key)); gcm_key->block = block; uint8_t ghash_key[16]; OPENSSL_memset(ghash_key, 0, sizeof(ghash_key)); (*block)(ghash_key, ghash_key, aes_key); int is_avx; CRYPTO_ghash_init(&gcm_key->gmult, &gcm_key->ghash, &gcm_key->H, gcm_key->Htable, &is_avx, ghash_key); gcm_key->use_aesni_gcm_crypt = (is_avx && block_is_hwaes) ? 1 : 0; } void CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const AES_KEY *key, const uint8_t *iv, size_t len) { #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF void (*gcm_gmult_p)(uint64_t Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gcm_key.gmult; #endif ctx->Yi.u[0] = 0; ctx->Yi.u[1] = 0; ctx->Xi.u[0] = 0; ctx->Xi.u[1] = 0; ctx->len.u[0] = 0; // AAD length ctx->len.u[1] = 0; // message length ctx->ares = 0; ctx->mres = 0; uint32_t ctr; if (len == 12) { OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->Yi.c, iv, 12); ctx->Yi.c[15] = 1; ctr = 1; } else { uint64_t len0 = len; while (len >= 16) { for (size_t i = 0; i < 16; ++i) { ctx->Yi.c[i] ^= iv[i]; } GCM_MUL(ctx, Yi); iv += 16; len -= 16; } if (len) { for (size_t i = 0; i < len; ++i) { ctx->Yi.c[i] ^= iv[i]; } GCM_MUL(ctx, Yi); } len0 <<= 3; ctx->Yi.u[1] ^= CRYPTO_bswap8(len0); GCM_MUL(ctx, Yi); ctr = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctx->Yi.d[3]); } (*ctx->gcm_key.block)(ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EK0.c, key); ++ctr; ctx->Yi.d[3] = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctr); } int CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const uint8_t *aad, size_t len) { #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF void (*gcm_gmult_p)(uint64_t Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gcm_key.gmult; void (*gcm_ghash_p)(uint64_t Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const uint8_t *inp, size_t len) = ctx->gcm_key.ghash; #endif if (ctx->len.u[1]) { return 0; } uint64_t alen = ctx->len.u[0] + len; if (alen > (UINT64_C(1) << 61) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && alen < len)) { return 0; } ctx->len.u[0] = alen; unsigned n = ctx->ares; if (n) { while (n && len) { ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= *(aad++); --len; n = (n + 1) % 16; } if (n == 0) { GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); } else { ctx->ares = n; return 1; } } // Process a whole number of blocks. size_t len_blocks = len & kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits; if (len_blocks != 0) { GHASH(ctx, aad, len_blocks); aad += len_blocks; len -= len_blocks; } // Process the remainder. if (len != 0) { n = (unsigned int)len; for (size_t i = 0; i < len; ++i) { ctx->Xi.c[i] ^= aad[i]; } } ctx->ares = n; return 1; } int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const AES_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len) { block128_f block = ctx->gcm_key.block; #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF void (*gcm_gmult_p)(uint64_t Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gcm_key.gmult; void (*gcm_ghash_p)(uint64_t Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const uint8_t *inp, size_t len) = ctx->gcm_key.ghash; #endif uint64_t mlen = ctx->len.u[1] + len; if (mlen > ((UINT64_C(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len)) { return 0; } ctx->len.u[1] = mlen; if (ctx->ares) { // First call to encrypt finalizes GHASH(AAD) GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); ctx->ares = 0; } unsigned n = ctx->mres; if (n) { while (n && len) { ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= *(out++) = *(in++) ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; --len; n = (n + 1) % 16; } if (n == 0) { GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); } else { ctx->mres = n; return 1; } } uint32_t ctr = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctx->Yi.d[3]); while (len >= GHASH_CHUNK) { size_t j = GHASH_CHUNK; while (j) { (*block)(ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; ctx->Yi.d[3] = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctr); for (size_t i = 0; i < 16; i += sizeof(crypto_word_t)) { CRYPTO_store_word_le(out + i, CRYPTO_load_word_le(in + i) ^ ctx->EKi.t[i / sizeof(crypto_word_t)]); } out += 16; in += 16; j -= 16; } GHASH(ctx, out - GHASH_CHUNK, GHASH_CHUNK); len -= GHASH_CHUNK; } size_t len_blocks = len & kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits; if (len_blocks != 0) { while (len >= 16) { (*block)(ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; ctx->Yi.d[3] = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctr); for (size_t i = 0; i < 16; i += sizeof(crypto_word_t)) { CRYPTO_store_word_le(out + i, CRYPTO_load_word_le(in + i) ^ ctx->EKi.t[i / sizeof(crypto_word_t)]); } out += 16; in += 16; len -= 16; } GHASH(ctx, out - len_blocks, len_blocks); } if (len) { (*block)(ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; ctx->Yi.d[3] = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctr); while (len--) { ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= out[n] = in[n] ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; ++n; } } ctx->mres = n; return 1; } int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, size_t len) { block128_f block = ctx->gcm_key.block; #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF void (*gcm_gmult_p)(uint64_t Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gcm_key.gmult; void (*gcm_ghash_p)(uint64_t Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const uint8_t *inp, size_t len) = ctx->gcm_key.ghash; #endif uint64_t mlen = ctx->len.u[1] + len; if (mlen > ((UINT64_C(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len)) { return 0; } ctx->len.u[1] = mlen; if (ctx->ares) { // First call to decrypt finalizes GHASH(AAD) GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); ctx->ares = 0; } unsigned n = ctx->mres; if (n) { while (n && len) { uint8_t c = *(in++); *(out++) = c ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= c; --len; n = (n + 1) % 16; } if (n == 0) { GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); } else { ctx->mres = n; return 1; } } uint32_t ctr = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctx->Yi.d[3]); while (len >= GHASH_CHUNK) { size_t j = GHASH_CHUNK; GHASH(ctx, in, GHASH_CHUNK); while (j) { (*block)(ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; ctx->Yi.d[3] = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctr); for (size_t i = 0; i < 16; i += sizeof(crypto_word_t)) { CRYPTO_store_word_le(out + i, CRYPTO_load_word_le(in + i) ^ ctx->EKi.t[i / sizeof(crypto_word_t)]); } out += 16; in += 16; j -= 16; } len -= GHASH_CHUNK; } size_t len_blocks = len & kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits; if (len_blocks != 0) { GHASH(ctx, in, len_blocks); while (len >= 16) { (*block)(ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; ctx->Yi.d[3] = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctr); for (size_t i = 0; i < 16; i += sizeof(crypto_word_t)) { CRYPTO_store_word_le(out + i, CRYPTO_load_word_le(in + i) ^ ctx->EKi.t[i / sizeof(crypto_word_t)]); } out += 16; in += 16; len -= 16; } } if (len) { (*block)(ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; ctx->Yi.d[3] = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctr); while (len--) { uint8_t c = in[n]; ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= c; out[n] = c ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; ++n; } } ctx->mres = n; return 1; } int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const AES_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len, ctr128_f stream) { #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF void (*gcm_gmult_p)(uint64_t Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gcm_key.gmult; void (*gcm_ghash_p)(uint64_t Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const uint8_t *inp, size_t len) = ctx->gcm_key.ghash; #endif uint64_t mlen = ctx->len.u[1] + len; if (mlen > ((UINT64_C(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len)) { return 0; } ctx->len.u[1] = mlen; if (ctx->ares) { // First call to encrypt finalizes GHASH(AAD) GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); ctx->ares = 0; } unsigned n = ctx->mres; if (n) { while (n && len) { ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= *(out++) = *(in++) ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; --len; n = (n + 1) % 16; } if (n == 0) { GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); } else { ctx->mres = n; return 1; } } #if defined(AESNI_GCM) // Check |len| to work around a C language bug. See https://crbug.com/1019588. if (ctx->gcm_key.use_aesni_gcm_crypt && len > 0) { // |aesni_gcm_encrypt| may not process all the input given to it. It may // not process *any* of its input if it is deemed too small. size_t bulk = aesni_gcm_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ctx->Yi.c, ctx->Xi.u); in += bulk; out += bulk; len -= bulk; } #endif uint32_t ctr = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctx->Yi.d[3]); while (len >= GHASH_CHUNK) { (*stream)(in, out, GHASH_CHUNK / 16, key, ctx->Yi.c); ctr += GHASH_CHUNK / 16; ctx->Yi.d[3] = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctr); GHASH(ctx, out, GHASH_CHUNK); out += GHASH_CHUNK; in += GHASH_CHUNK; len -= GHASH_CHUNK; } size_t len_blocks = len & kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits; if (len_blocks != 0) { size_t j = len_blocks / 16; (*stream)(in, out, j, key, ctx->Yi.c); ctr += (unsigned int)j; ctx->Yi.d[3] = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctr); in += len_blocks; len -= len_blocks; GHASH(ctx, out, len_blocks); out += len_blocks; } if (len) { (*ctx->gcm_key.block)(ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; ctx->Yi.d[3] = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctr); while (len--) { ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= out[n] = in[n] ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; ++n; } } ctx->mres = n; return 1; } int CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const AES_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len, ctr128_f stream) { #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF void (*gcm_gmult_p)(uint64_t Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gcm_key.gmult; void (*gcm_ghash_p)(uint64_t Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const uint8_t *inp, size_t len) = ctx->gcm_key.ghash; #endif uint64_t mlen = ctx->len.u[1] + len; if (mlen > ((UINT64_C(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len)) { return 0; } ctx->len.u[1] = mlen; if (ctx->ares) { // First call to decrypt finalizes GHASH(AAD) GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); ctx->ares = 0; } unsigned n = ctx->mres; if (n) { while (n && len) { uint8_t c = *(in++); *(out++) = c ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= c; --len; n = (n + 1) % 16; } if (n == 0) { GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); } else { ctx->mres = n; return 1; } } #if defined(AESNI_GCM) // Check |len| to work around a C language bug. See https://crbug.com/1019588. if (ctx->gcm_key.use_aesni_gcm_crypt && len > 0) { // |aesni_gcm_decrypt| may not process all the input given to it. It may // not process *any* of its input if it is deemed too small. size_t bulk = aesni_gcm_decrypt(in, out, len, key, ctx->Yi.c, ctx->Xi.u); in += bulk; out += bulk; len -= bulk; } #endif uint32_t ctr = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctx->Yi.d[3]); while (len >= GHASH_CHUNK) { GHASH(ctx, in, GHASH_CHUNK); (*stream)(in, out, GHASH_CHUNK / 16, key, ctx->Yi.c); ctr += GHASH_CHUNK / 16; ctx->Yi.d[3] = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctr); out += GHASH_CHUNK; in += GHASH_CHUNK; len -= GHASH_CHUNK; } size_t len_blocks = len & kSizeTWithoutLower4Bits; if (len_blocks != 0) { size_t j = len_blocks / 16; GHASH(ctx, in, len_blocks); (*stream)(in, out, j, key, ctx->Yi.c); ctr += (unsigned int)j; ctx->Yi.d[3] = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctr); out += len_blocks; in += len_blocks; len -= len_blocks; } if (len) { (*ctx->gcm_key.block)(ctx->Yi.c, ctx->EKi.c, key); ++ctr; ctx->Yi.d[3] = CRYPTO_bswap4(ctr); while (len--) { uint8_t c = in[n]; ctx->Xi.c[n] ^= c; out[n] = c ^ ctx->EKi.c[n]; ++n; } } ctx->mres = n; return 1; } int CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, const uint8_t *tag, size_t len) { #ifdef GCM_FUNCREF void (*gcm_gmult_p)(uint64_t Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16]) = ctx->gcm_key.gmult; #endif if (ctx->mres || ctx->ares) { GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); } ctx->Xi.u[0] ^= CRYPTO_bswap8(ctx->len.u[0] << 3); ctx->Xi.u[1] ^= CRYPTO_bswap8(ctx->len.u[1] << 3); GCM_MUL(ctx, Xi); ctx->Xi.u[0] ^= ctx->EK0.u[0]; ctx->Xi.u[1] ^= ctx->EK0.u[1]; if (tag && len <= sizeof(ctx->Xi)) { return CRYPTO_memcmp(ctx->Xi.c, tag, len) == 0; } else { return 0; } } void CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t len) { CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(ctx, NULL, 0); OPENSSL_memcpy(tag, ctx->Xi.c, len <= sizeof(ctx->Xi.c) ? len : sizeof(ctx->Xi.c)); } #if defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) int crypto_gcm_clmul_enabled(void) { #if defined(GHASH_ASM_X86) || defined(GHASH_ASM_X86_64) const uint32_t *ia32cap = OPENSSL_ia32cap_get(); return (ia32cap[0] & (1 << 24)) && // check FXSR bit (ia32cap[1] & (1 << 1)); // check PCLMULQDQ bit #else return 0; #endif } #endif