# SQL injection review

Codex thread: `01a0b5be-55f5-7212-927f-2b95930e99c8`

Source: `rollout-2026-09-18T15-19-05-01a0b5be-55f5-7212-927f-2b95930e99c8.jsonl`

Visible user and assistant messages. See [export scope](README.md).

## user · 2026-09-18T18:19:16.052Z

check the go implementation for sql injections please

## assistant · 2026-09-18T18:19:19.882Z

I’ll check how the Go code builds and executes SQL, trace any untrusted inputs, and report exploitable paths. I’m applying the unslop skill to keep the review clear and concise.

## assistant · 2026-09-18T18:19:45.282Z

The request values I’ve traced all use SQL parameters. I found a few concatenated SQL fragments, but they come from fixed code strings, including the table names passed to `exists`. I’m checking the remaining callers and migration code for exceptions.

## assistant · 2026-09-18T18:20:04.258Z

I found **no exploitable SQL injection paths** in the Go service.

- Search, email, tag slugs, IDs, titles, and bodies all use pgx parameters such as `$1`. User input never becomes SQL syntax.
- Dynamic `WHERE` fragments come from fixed strings in [store.go](/home/unmbp/projects/work/assignments/fintual/backend-devops-interview/go-service/store.go:78).
- Migration SQL comes from an embedded schema file, with no request input.

One hardening opportunity: [`exists()`](/home/unmbp/projects/work/assignments/fintual/backend-devops-interview/go-service/store.go:225) concatenates a table name. Every current caller supplies the literal `blog_user` or `blog_post`, so it is safe today. An explicit allowlist would protect against future misuse.

This was a static review of the request handlers, database calls, migrations, and supporting harness. I did not run live injection tests or change files.